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Background
Conserving forest biodiversity is an urgent task in boreal commercial
private forests, which have been subject to intensive forest manage-
ment. The most typical forest management regime in boreal forests is
even-aged management, which reinforces the problem. Biodiversity is
threatened in multiple ways. Old growth forest land area has
decreased and become increasingly fragmented patches which can
weaken forest’s ability to sustain old growth species. Habitats suited to
old growth species (decaying wood, brooks etc.) are severely reduced.
The number of threatened and red-listed forest species has increased
dramatically. Genetic diversity decreases along with diminishing old
growth forests, which is a potentially growing problem when climate
change continues and original boreal forests need to adapt to warmer
climate.
All these problems are present in Finnish forestry, especially in
Southern Finland. To stop the decline in the biodiversity of forest habi-
tats and species in Southern Finland, the Finnish government
Payments for ecosystem services
could be a mean to increase
the maintenance and provision
of ecosystem services, which
otherwise would provide a too low
return to forest landowners.
This paper examines the recent
experience from applying bidding
sytems for forest biodiversity,
in Finland. The Finnish Metso
programme is an example of
voluntary bidding systems, which
are mediated by the government
and are capable to encourage
participation of conservation-
minded forest landowners.
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launched the Forest Biodiversity Programme
for Southern Finland (METSO) for years
2003-2016. METSO is a comprehensive pro-
gram with means for temporary conserva-
tion and permanent protection. METSO
introduced new voluntary instruments to
forest conservation: trading in nature values
and tendering (TNV), with a pilot project in
2003-2007; nature management areas; and
landowners’ co-operation network for biodi-
versity conservation. It retains many old typ-
ical instruments such as preservation of
state owned forests and restoration and
nature management of preserved habitats.
The most interesting part of the new
METSO program is the pilot Trading in
Nature Values. For the first time in the his-
tory of forestry, a country has applied a ten-
dering system to conserve biodiversity and
pays the landowners for maintaining forest
biodiversity. All in all, the TNV pilot repre-
sents a new payment for ecosystem services
in forestry. Because of the importance of the
pilot, the Finnish government decided that
for the two first years the data of the signed
agreement be open for research. Information
is available on habitat type (herb-rich, mesic,
and xeric forest types), ecological character-
istics, stand area, stand age, stand volume,
timber value (TIV), year of the contract, and
actual conservation payments paid to
landowners for the 10-year contract. This
paper condenses some results from the per-
formance of the TVN in METSO program
(for more details, see JUUTINEN et al 2009,
JUUTINEN and OLLIKAINEN 2010, and
JUUTINEN et al 2011).
Description of the TNV Pilot
The TNV pilot program was carried out in
2003-2007 in southwestern Finland. The
region lies mainly in the southern boreal
zone. About 65% of total area is under forest
cover and subject to commercial forestry.
Less than 1% of the forest area in the region
is strictly protected. The ecologically most
valuable sites in the region are the old semi-
natural stands, which have not been subject
to forest management for several decades.
The TNV program was based on 10-year
contracts between private non-industrial
landowners and the government.
Landowners were called to submit their
stands with associated bids to the program.
To this end, an individual landowner submit-
ted a specific declaration, which included the
description of the ecological characteristics of
the offered stand. Drawing on the declara-
tion form, the government assessed prelimi-
narily whether each offered stand was valu-
able enough for conservation or not. The
process ceased if the preliminary assessment
showed that the stand was not ecologically
valuable and no agreement was made. For
promising stands, a forestry expert from the
Forestry Centre made a field inventory using
a pre-determined valuation mechanism.
This conservation value included different
ecological characteristics of the stand (e.g.
large broadleaved trees and pines, dead or
burned trees, threatened species, luxurious
vegetation, natural water conditions, dis-
tance to existing nature protection areas,
size of the area, and landscape values) and
their imputed prices. The prices were set by
expert guidelines. The value included also
costs of delayed harvesting — defined as the
present value of the lost harvest revenue —
calculated by using a 1% interest rate for the
value of standing timber. After the valuation
was complete, the government and the
landowner negotiated about the compensa-
tion payment and the required protection
activities. The conservation value was
revealed to landowners before negotiations.
The contract specified biodiversity services
and the rental payment for them; harvesting
was prohibited during the contract period.
The annual budget for TNV was about
400.000 euros and 158 biodiversity conserva-
tion contracts were signed during 2003-2007.
A contract typically included several stands,
but the value of each stand was assessed
separately. Some landowners preferred to
make separate contracts for each stand. The
number of landowners who offered stands to
the program was 356. The acceptance rate of
bids was about 44 %. The main reason for
the rejection of the bids was the low ecologi-
cal quality of supplied stands but in some
cases there was disagreement on the com-
pensation, the rental payment to the
landowner.
The TNV pilot program can be analyzed
either as a tendering or a bargaining system.
Although TNV was not conducted entirely by
the book (of green auction), it has many fea-
tures of tendering, such as several landown-
ers were offering their stands and bids to the
430
Mediterranean Forest Week of Avignon
431
program simultaneously. Therefore, the the-
ory of green auctions is a natural framework
to study the performance of the TNV pilot.
Tendering/bidding system
as a payment for ecosystem
services
Tendering systems are shown to be a more
efficient way of allocating conservation than
the fix flat payment systems most often
applied in environmental policies (LATACZ-
LOHMAN and VAN DER HAMSVOORT 1998). Flat
rate policies provide to agents with low con-
servation costs high information rents —
defined as the difference between the pay-
ment and actual conservation costs. By
creating competition between landowners
tendering systems make landowners par-
tially reveal their conservation costs. This
reduces but does not entirely eliminate the
information rents of environmental policies.
Using arbitrary numbers reflecting,
though, roughly those of the TNV pilot,
Figure 1 illustrates how a tendering/bidding
system differs from the conventional flat rate
policy. The vertical axis denotes the conser-
vation costs of and payments to landowners
and the horizontal axis denotes stands,
ordered from the cheapest to the most expen-
sive according to their conservation costs.
The flat rate (for ten years) is set at a level
2000 euros.ha-1 and paid to all stands offered
in the conservation program. The lower con-
vex curve indicates the true conservation
costs. The last stand offered to a program
under a flat rate policy is stand n°71, which
has conservation costs just equal to the pay-
ment. The 71 stands consume the conserva-
tion budget, 400 000 assuming the size of
each is slightly less than 3 hectares, Stands
to the left from stand n°71 receive informa-
tion rent roughly 53 643.3 euros.ha-1 and is
graphically described as the sum of areas
A+B.
The upper curve in Figure 1 indicates the
bids in the tendering/bidding system -
ordered, again, from the lowest to the high-
est bids. Landowners are paid according to
their bids and once stand n°84 is enrolled,
the conservation budget is consumed. A
higher number of stands is enrolled, because
the information rent to landowners is
decreased by area A. The information rent in
this tendering example is 23 224 euros.ha-1
and it means 30 419 euros reduction in infor-
mation rents (area A) relative to the flat rate
policy. Using this saving (denoted by area C,
which equals area A) allows the authorities
to expand conservation by 13 stands. By cre-
ating competition between the landowners,
the tendering/bidding system leads to a
higher environmental quality and an
improved use of conservation budget. More
importantly, as a voluntary payment system,
in which landowners freely submit their
bids, tendering increases interest and moti-
vation for conservation.
Analysis of the TNV pilot
programme
Table 1 represents actual data from the
TNV pilot on the mean values of the stand
ages and volumes; as well as biodiversity
scores and the bids. Drawing on reported for-
est data from the pilot, JUUTINEN and
OLLIKAINEN (2010) estimated conservation
costs and used the estimates to determine
the information rents. Table 1 is revealing in
many ways. In general, the enrolled stands
are fairly old, and the timber volumes reflect
growing conditions in Southern Finland.
Interestingly, the youngest stands receive
the highest rents, as they are not mature for
harvesting and thereby entail no costs from
participating in the program.
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Figure 1:
Flat rate policy versus
tendering/bidding system
in conservation
An important observation is the high num-
ber of old growth stands in herb-rich and
mesic forest types. They account for 41% of
all conserved stands. Moreover, information
rents for these stands are very low. In fact,
with one exception (Dryish 98-110), these
stands receive the lowest rents. The high
number of the enrolled old stands on the eco-
logically most valuable forest habitat types
indicates strong conservation motives by the
landowners. These landowners clearly derive
welfare from forest amenities, in addition to
harvest revenue. They apply rotation ages
that are longer than the commercial ages.
Therefore, these landowners reduce their
bids to improve the chance of becoming
selected in the program.
The outcome of the TNV can be compared
with results of a hypothetical forest biodi-
vidersity auction simulation (JUUTINEN and
OLLIKAINEN 2010). The simulation model
assumes all forest landowners maximize the
net present value of harvest revenue.
Results from the simulation are reported in
Table 2. The first thing to note is that the
amount of old growth stands in the ecologi-
cally and economically valuable herb-rich
forest types is lower than in the actual data.
Now old stands are selected in the ecologi-
cally less valuable and cheaper mesic stands.
The number of stands enrolled by the same
budget is lower than in the actual data (67
versus 72). This partly explains why the
average biodiversity score is higher in Table
2 than in Table 1.
A comparison of Table 1 and 2 reveals that
the average bid in the auction simulation is
2964 euros, while the actual average bid was
1757 euros, giving a saving of 1207 euros in
the actual TNV pilot. The information rents
in the simulation model are 2964 euros;
thus, much higher than the estimated infor-
mation rents in the actual case (568 euros).
These findings reinforce the impression that
TNV pilot with tendering features invites
conservation-minded landowners to submit
their stands to the program.
This conclusion can be further strength-
ened when one distinguishes between net
present value maximizing and conservation-
minded landowner types (the former approx-
imated by the Faustmann model and the lat-
ter by the Hartman model). Using the
commercial rotation age, JUUTINEN et al.
(2011) demonstrate that for the Faustmann
landowners, the actual information rent is
on average 1000 euros over the 10 year
period making roughly 55% of the total pay-
ment made to landowners. For Hartman
landowners the picture looks very different.
Now each individual landowner resorts to a
rotation age based on their personal amenity
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Forest type Enrolled Diversity Bids, Costs Rents
(age class) stands score €/ha €/ha €/ha
Herb-rich (100) 7 0,80 3183 1629 1554
Herb-rich (60) 7 0,73 2914 576 2338
Herb-rich (40) 5 0.70 2804 -326 3129
Mesic (120) 15 0.76 3027 1501 1526
Mesic (70) 17 0.75 3009 440 2569
Mesic (55) 7 0,71 2831 -44 2874
Dryish (140) 6 0,72 2866 662 2204
Dryish (85) 3 0,69 2779 129 2651
All 67 0,74 2964 714 2250
Table 2:
Biodiversity auction: the
number of enrolled
stands and their average
characteris-
tics by forest types.
(Conservation
budget 200 000 €)
Source: Juutinen and
Ollikainen (2010).
Forest type Enrolled Stand Stand Biodiv. Bids, Costs Inforents
(age class) stands age volume score €/ha €/ha €/ha
yr m3/ha
Herb-rich (87-160) 17 111 280 0.48 2 125 1 893 232
Herb-rich (56-80) 13 68 230 0.48 1 838 937 901
Herb-rich (41-50) 5 45 227 0.53 1 620 60 1 560
Mesic (102-170) 12 123 242 0.42 1 908 1 673 235
Mesic (70-95) 15 83 218 0.40 1 654 943 712
Mesic (50-61) 3 57 115 0.24 1 177 248 929
Dryish (150-178) 4 165 155 0.42 1 355 1 039 316
Dryish (98-110) 3 103 82 0.25 567 611 -44
All 72 95 226 0.43 1 757 1 189 568
Table 1:
The number of enrolled
stands and their average
characteristics in the
Finnish Trading in Natural
Values Program
Source: Juutinen and
Ollikainen (2010)
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valuation. When only costs from delayed
harvest are accounted for, Hartman
landowners receive extremely low and even
negative information rents. The average
information rent is only 152 euros and
makes just 3% of the total payments. The
Finnish TNV pilot really provided conserva-
tion-minded landowners a platform to con-
serve biodiversity. Equally importantly, for
Faustmann landowners the TNV offered an
alternative to immediate harvesting and
rational landowners clearly used this oppor-
tunity whenever it was the more profitable
option.
Conclusions
The Finnish pilot Trading in Nature
Values on forest biodiversity conservation
provides an interesting, innovative and suc-
cessful application of a new payment instru-
ment to finance the provision of forest
ecosystem services. The TNV provided
landowners with conservation motives a
good opportunity to participate in the biodi-
versity conservation. It was equally signifi-
cant that the landowners’ participation was
active and they valued the chosen voluntary
participation and payment method.
Furthermore, awareness on the importance
of forest biodiversity increased thanks to the
pilot.
A mid-term evaluation of the whole
METSO program in 2010 regarded the TNV
and the whole program highly successful.
The TNV pilot was extended from Satakunta
region to the whole of Southern Finland.
Unfortunately, however, the rules of TNV
have been changed. Now only very narrowly
determined conservation costs are compen-
sated to landowners. This has much reduced
the use of the TNV system. The reason for
this obvious drawback is to my understand-
ing two-fold. First, the European Union criti-
cized Finland for using a system, which com-
pensates for benefits and does not focusing
solely on the compliance costs. Second, the
TNV pilot required active cooperation
between officials in forestry and environ-
mental organizations belonging to two differ-
ent ministries. Obviously official on both
organizations preferred a system, where
cooperation was not needed.
I regard this new development as a fatal
drawback. Creative thinking is needed to
reintroduce and restore the true tendering-
based character of the TNV program despite
EU’s and officials negative attitudes.
M.O.
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Financing biodiversity in private forests: The METSO programme
The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment defines ecosystem services generally as the benefits people
obtain from the ecosystems. The provision of ecosystem services falls short of achieving the socially
desirable level, thanks to such reasons as undefined property rights, capital market imperfections and
externalities. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) provide a means to overcome externality problems
and increase the maintenance and provision of ecosystem services, which otherwise would provide a
too low return to landowners in comparison to what they can obtain from land conversion to ordinary
business purposes. PES consists of a set of voluntary financial instruments and arrangements between
ecosystem service providers and benefiters, sometimes through a mediator, like the government. PES
can and also have been used to promote the provision of biodiversity benefits, carbon sequestration,
and water services among others.
This paper examines the recent experience from applying bidding sytems for forest biodiversity. The
Finnish Metso programme is discussed as an example of voluntary bidding systems, which are mediated
by the government and are capable to encourage participation of conservation-minded forest landow-
ners.
Keywords : externalities, payments for ecosystem services, bidding systems
Summary
Résumé
Le Millenium Ecosystem Assessment définit généralement les services écosystémiques comme les béné-
fices reçus par les populations à partir des écosystèmes. La fourniture de services écosystémiques est
loin d'atteindre le niveau socialement souhaitable, à cause de lacunes telles que les droits de propriété
non définis, les imperfections du marché des capitaux et les externalités. Les paiements pour services
écosystémiques (PSE) proposent un moyen de surmonter les problèmes d'externalité et d’augmenter la
pérennité et la fourniture de services écosystémiques, qui autrement auraient un rendement trop faible
pour les propriétaires en comparaison de ce qu'ils peuvent obtenir auprès de la conversion des terres à
des fins de transactions commerciales ordinaires. Le PSE est composé d'un ensemble d'instruments
volontaires et arrangements financiers entre les fournisseurs de services écosystémiques et les bénéfi-
ciaires, parfois par le biais d'un médiateur, comme le gouvernement. Le PSE a été utilisé pour promou-
voir la fourniture de bénéfices pour la biodiversité, la séquestration du carbone et la ressource en eau,
entre autres.
Cet article présente plus particulièrement l'expérience récente de l'application du système d’appel d'of-
fres pour la biodiversité des forêts en Finlande. Le programme finlandais METSO est discuté comme un
exemple de systèmes d'enchères volontaires, qui sont coordonnés par le gouvernement et sont capa-
bles d'encourager la participation des propriétaires forestiers soucieux de la conservation.
Mots-clé : externalités, paiements pour services écosystémiques, systèmes d’enchères.
